
by Brian Dunning
November 3, 2026
Over the years we’ve done a number of episodes on logical fallacies — the common ones, some newer ones, even some proposed ones. Throughout it all I’ve always felt the creep of a new pet peeve arising: the misuse of logical fallacies. Now strictly speaking, any use of a logical fallacy is a misuse, if you will; but in this case, I’m talking about when people misidentify one or misunderstand what exactly one of them is. So today’s episode is going to focus on these abuses and misuses — and hopefully, help us all spot them a little bit more accurately.
I also hope this episode transcript page on Skeptoid.com will serve as a handy guide that you can post a link to whenever you catch someone committing such an abuse online. As you know, people love being told that they’re wrong, and given a web link to prove it! So without further ado, here is my list of the Most Abused Logical Fallacies, 2026 edition, in alphabetical order:
1. Ad Hominem
Without a doubt, this is the one that, when misused, I read and hear more often than any other. The way it is often misused, you could define an ad hominem as:
Wrong definition: Attacking the person instead of the position.
Examples include calling someone names, pointing out something bad about them (true or not), anything that attacks that person instead of addressing the position or argument they are making. Well, that’s not an ad hominem. That’s an insult. There are lots of ways to say something nasty about someone that do not extend to an ad hominem. Instead, it really means this:
Correct definition: Rejecting an argument because of who made it, rather than on its merits.
For example, calling someone a jerk for working at Facebook is just being nasty — it doesn’t matter whether they actually are a jerk or not, it’s not a logical fallacy; it’s just an insult. However, saying that any advice you might get from a Facebook employee about digital privacy is automatically wrong, is fallacious logic. If their advice is wrong, you need to point out what’s wrong about it; the reason can’t be simply that it came from a Facebook employee. Insults are not ad hominems.
2. Anecdotal Evidence
The complete dismissal of anecdotal evidence is usually a blunder, and you shouldn’t do it. We’ve all heard the mantra “The plural of anecdote is not data,” which means that no matter how many anecdotes you have — like claims of Bigfoot sightings — they do not aggregate into evidence that Bigfoot is real.
This doesn’t mean that anecdotes are without value, because they often are. If a hundred people said they saw Bigfoot footprints on a particular ridge, it’s less foolish to go set up a camera trap on that ridge to see if you can collect some actual data. Anecdotes can suggest directions for further research. Many hypotheses that get tested stem from anecdotal reports; if a bunch of people develop a rash and you hear someone describe a plant that sounds a lot like poison oak, well now you’ve got a strong hypothesis worth testing, thanks to an anecdote. In medicine, many cases studies are largely anecdotal, but these play a big role in helping doctors track down the causes of disease.
Give anecdotes their due — which is almost always non-zero.
3. Appeal to Authority
Skeptics will often get inappropriately accused of using the Appeal to Authority fallacy when pointing out that, say, the American Academy of Pediatrics supports the use of vaccines for children. Well, no — referencing an actual authoritative expert consensus is not what the Appeal to Authority refers to. Some examples of what the fallacy really means would be:
- The fallacious use of authoritative imagery, such as putting a labcoat on an actor, to sell some worthless supplement product;
- Referencing an authority in such a way suggesting that their authority alone overrides the evidence; or
- Referencing an irrelevant authority.
A common example of this latter case is when opponents of glyphosate, the world’s safest and most effective herbicide, point out that the IARC has classified it as a “probable carcinogen.” Why is that irrelevant? Partly because that classification is heavily disputed, but mainly because the IARC’s classifications are hazard assessments, not risk assessments, and are explicitly not to be used to assess health risks.
Continue using actual authoritative findings where appropriate. It’s the people who choose to dismiss those simply because they are authoritative who are making the error.
4. Appeal to Fallacy
By this I mean that practically any logical fallacy can be abused by simply calling it out when used against you, and considering that alone to be a worthy rebuttal, for example:
Common misuse of fallacies: You’re wrong because you just employed the Appeal to Antiquity.
But no, sound logic doesn’t work that way. If their position is wrong, it’s wrong whether they used a logical fallacy to defend it or not; and your job is to point out why it’s wrong. Calling out some logical fallacy they may have employed does nothing to show what’s wrong with their position.
Correct avoidance of misusing fallacies: You’re wrong that seaweed cures cancer because the ancient Chinese believed it; we know it doesn’t cure cancer because it has failed clinical trials.
It’s not wrong to point out logical fallacies, it’s just wrong to consider that alone to be a rebuttal of the position the fallacy was trying to defend.
5. Appeal to Popularity
The Appeal to Popularity, also sometimes called the Bandwagon Fallacy, states that something is true because a lot of people believe it. I have been wrongly accused of using this fallacy many times — one of the more common instances is the old number “97 out of 100 published climate articles agree that global warming is caused by humans burning fossil fuel” (I say “old number” because that’s 10 years old; today it’s 100 out of 100). Invariably some climate denier calls me out for “employing the Appeal to Popularity.” Lots of scientists believing something doesn’t make it true. That’s right; what makes it almost certainly true is that a scientific consensus exists.
You may already know this, but consensus doesn’t mean the same thing in a scientific context as it does elsewhere. It doesn’t mean that everyone pretty much agrees; it means there’s broad experimental replication. In science it’s not a consensus of opinion; it’s a consensus of experimental results — which don’t care what anybody thinks.
Conversely, the Appeal to Popularity is exactly that: a lot of people think something, whether it’s supported by science or not — therefore it must be true.
6. Begging the Question
This is another one that’s almost always used wrong; in fact, I’d venture to guess that very few people know what begging the question actually is, because it has a pretty nuanced meaning. The way we usually hear it isn’t even as a logical fallacy, but just as a phrase in common speech.
Common misuse: The bridge was inspected in March and then it collapsed in April, which begs the question of whether the inspector did their job.
It’s used as if it’s a synonym for “raises the question.” The bridge collapsing raises the question about what the inspectors did; it does not beg the question. Now here is how begging the question is actually defined, and notice that it doesn’t really have anything to do with begging or with questions:
Correct definition: Assuming the conclusion is already contained in the premise, e.g., “Uncle Bob is very trustworthy, so he would never lie about this.”
To find out whether Uncle Bob lied, we need to establish the facts of the situation; whether he’s normally trustworthy isn’t relevant.
The reason this is called “begging the question” goes back to an awkward translation of the original awkward Latin petitio principii which means asking for the starting point. In formal debates, it’s common to ask the other side to concede certain premises. Asking the other side to concede that Uncle Bob is very trustworthy basically includes the intended conclusion, which is that he could not be a liar. So this would be asking (or “begging”) them to concede the “question” at issue. This is obviously pretty cumbersome, so in common speech, we often just say it when we intend the completely unrelated “raising the question.”
7. Naturalistic Fallacy
Here’s another one where the original meaning has been essentially lost to the point that we don’t really use it anymore. Instead, we often misdefine the naturalistic fallacy as if it is a synonym of the Appeal to Nature:
Wrong definition: Arguing that something must be safe or healthy just because it comes from nature.
...And we’ve heard this fallacy rebutted by the existence of natural things like rattlesnake venom, asbestos, Salmonella, and box jellyfish neurotoxin. That’s the Appeal to Nature. The naturalistic fallacy, however, goes back to G.E. Moore’s 1903 treatise Principia Ethica in which he proposed that indefinable things such as the concept of “goodness” were unnatural; and trying to redefine them as some natural thing like “happy” was fallacious:
Original definition: Defining an undefinable thing as something that they are not.
And this is obviously not something that pops up in daily conversation, or ever really, outside of philosophy classrooms. By now, we’ve misused “Naturalistic Fallacy” to mean “Appeal to Nature” so often (I’ve done it myself) that it has become a de facto synonym.
8. Occam’s Razor
Occam’s Razor isn’t misused so much as it is misdefined. The common definition of it is:
Wrong definition: The simplest explanation is most likely correct.
But that isn’t it at all. If you see a white light go whizzing through the sky one night, “alien spaceship” is a very simple explanation — but it’s also wrong, and if you used that definition of Occam’s Razor to help you identify it, you’d be led astray. Instead:
Correct definition: The explanation requiring the fewest new assumptions is to be preferred.
A shooting star is an explanation that requires no new assumptions at all: we know that meteors often enter our atmosphere and burn up, manifesting as a white dot that goes whizzing through the sky. We don’t have to make up anything new about the world to allow that explanation.
However, consider all the new assumptions the “alien spaceship” explanation would require. We’d have to assume that aliens visit the Earth; that their spaceships cross interstellar distances in reasonable time frames, and thus that they’ve found a way around the laws of physics; that they like to put on dramatic light shows in the skies of planets they visit, expending huge amounts of energy for no benefit; etc., etc., etc. So forget simple explanations. Stick with ones that require no new assumptions about the way our world works.
And that concludes my 2026 edition of Abused Logical Fallacies. So, depending on what gets abused in 2027, I will perhaps see you again to revisit this. Until then, keep your fallacies straight, and your arguments straighter.
























